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Abstract Chaotic behavior arising from very simple
non-linear dynamical equation of logistic map makes it
was used often in designing chaotic image encryption
schemes. However, some properties of chaotic maps can
also facilitate cryptanalysis especially when they are
implemented in digital domain. Utilizing stable distri-
bution of the chaotic states generated by iterating the
logistic map, this paper present a typical example to
show insecurity of an image encryption scheme using
chaotic logistic map. This work will push encryption
and chaos be combined in a more effective way.
Keywords cryptanalysis · chosen-plaintext attack ·
image encryption · logistic map
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of information transmis-
sion technology and popularization of multimedia cap-
ture device, multimedia data are transmitted over all
kinds of wired/wireless networks more and more fre-
quently. Consequently, the security of multimedia data
becomes a serious concern of many people. However,
the traditional text encryption schemes cannot protect
multimedia data efficiently, mainly due to the big dif-
ferences between textual and multimedia data, such as
Chengqing Li, Tao Xie, Qi Liu
MOE Key Laboratory of Intelligent Computing and Informa-
tion Processing, College of Information Engineering, Xiang-
tan University, Xiangtan 411105, Hunan, China
Tel.: +86-731-52639779
Fax: +86-731-58292217
E-mail: Chengqingg@gmail.com
Ge Cheng
School of Mathematics and Computational Science, Xiangtan
University, Xiangtan 411105, Hunan, China
strong redundancy between neighboring elements of un-
compressed multimedia data, bulky size of multimedia
data, and some special requirements of the whole multi-
media processing system. This challenge stirs the design
of special multimedia encryption schemes to become a
hot research topic in multimedia processing area in the
past two decades.
Because there are some subtle similarities between
chaos and cryptography, chaos were used to design po-
tential secure and efficient schemes in all kinds of ap-
plications in cryptography. Due to easy presentation
of image datum, most cryptographic schemes consider
image data as operation object [6, 17, 22]. According
to the record of Web of Science, about two thousands
of articles on chaos-based cryptology were published
in the past two decades. Unfortunately, many of them
have been found to have security problems of differ-
ent degree from the viewpoint of modern cryptology
[2, 3, 7, 9–11, 24]. In general, cryptanalysis (breaking or
reporting some security defects) of a given encryption
scheme requires rigorous theoretical support, so only
about one tenth of the proposed chaos-based encryption
schemes were reported being cryptanalyzed till now.
At the same time, the conventional cryptanalysis skills
cannot be directly used to break the chaos-based en-
cryption schemes due to some reasons, such as differ-
ence of essential structure, and some special security
defects caused by the properties of the adopted chaos
system [5,13,25]. Therefore, short of security scrutiny of
the proposed chaos-based encryption schemes has be-
come bottleneck of progress of chaos-based cryptology.
Some general rules about evaluating security of chaos-
based encryption schemes are concluded in [1, 14].
Logistic map is a discrete quadratic recurrence form
of the logistic equation, a model of population growth
first published by P. Verhulst in 1845. The application
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of logistic map in cryptology can be traced back to John
von Neumann’s suggestion on utilizing it as a random
number generator in 1947 [23]. Due to simple form and
relatively complex dynamical properties of logistic map,
it was extensively used to design encryption schemes or
pseudo-random number generator [4,8,20]. Even in Web
of Science, one can find about two hundred records on
application of logistic map in cryptography published
between 1998 and 2013. A few papers reported some
security deficiencies caused by logistic map [15,19].
In [18], an image encryption scheme based on the
logistic and standard maps was proposed, where the
two maps are iterated to generate some pseudo-random
number sequences (PRNS) controlling twice exclusive
OR (XOR) operations. In [21], it is reported that an
equivalent key of the scheme can be obtained from only
one known/chosen plain-image and the corresponding
cipher-image. However, the equivalent key can only be
used to decrypt other cipher-images of smaller or the
same size of the known/chosen plain-image. Based on a
dynamical property of logistic map on stable distribu-
tion of its chaotic states, the present paper re-evaluates
the security of the scheme, and finds that the scope of
all the sub-keys can be narrowed much by an efficient
brute-force search.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the image encryption scheme under
study briefly. Our cryptanalytic results are presented
in Sec. 3 in detail. The last section concludes the pa-
per.
2 The image encryption scheme under study
The plaintext encrypted by the image encryption scheme
under study is a RGB true-color image of size M ×N
(height×width), which can be denoted by an M × N
matrix of 3-tuple pixel values I = {(R(i, j), G(i, j),
B(i, j))} 0≤i≤M−1
0≤j≤N−1
. Denoting the cipher image by I′ =
{(R′(i, j), G′(i, j), B′(i, j))} 0≤i≤M−1
0≤j≤N−1
, the image encryp-
tion scheme can be described as follows1.
– Secret key : three floating-point numbers x0, y0, K,
and one integer L, where x0, y0 ∈ (0, 2pi), K > 18,
100 < L < 1100.
– Initialization: prepare data for encryption/decryption
by performing the following steps.
a) Generate four XORing keys as follows: Xkey(0) =
b256x0/(2pi)c, Xkey(1) = b256y0/(2pi)c, Xkey(2)
= bK mod 256c, Xkey(3) = (L mod 256). Then,
1 To make the presentation more concise and complete,
some notations in the original paper are modified provided
that its essential form kept unchanged.
generate a pseudo-image IXkey = {(RXkey(i, j),
GXkey(i, j), BXkey(i, j))} 0≤i≤H−1
0≤j≤W−1
by assigning an
M×N matrix with the four XORing keys repeat-
edly:
RXkey(i, j) = Xkey(3k mod 4),
GXkey(i, j) = Xkey((3k + 1) mod 4),
BXkey(i, j) = Xkey((3k + 2) mod 4), where k =
iN + j.
b) Iterate the standard map{
x = (x+K sin(y)) mod (2pi),
y = (y + x+K sin(y)) mod (2pi),
from the initial conditions (x0, y0) L times to
obtain a new chaotic state (x′0, y
′
0). Then, further
iterate it MN more times to get MN chaotic
states {(xi, yi)}MNi=1 .
c) Iterate the logistic map
f(x) = 4x(1− x) (1)
from the initial condition z0 = ((x
′
0 +y
′
0) mod 1)
for L times to get a new initial condition z′0.
Then, further iterate it forMN times to getMN
chaotic states {zi}MNi=1 .
d) Generate a chaotic key stream (CKS) image ICKS =
{(CKSR(i, j), CKSG(i, j), CKSB(i, j))} 0≤i≤M−1
0≤j≤N−1
as follows: CKSR(i, j) = b256xk/(2pi)c, CKSG(i, j)
=b256yk/(2pi)c and
CKSB(i, j) = z˜k = b256zkc , (2)
where k = iN + j + 1.
– Encryption procedure: a simple concatenation of the
following four encryption operations.
– Confusion I : masking the plain pixel values by
the four XORing keys {Xkey(i)}3i=0. For k =
0, . . . ,MN − 1, set
R?(i, j) = R(i, j)⊕RXkey(i, j),
G?(i, j) = G(i, j)⊕GXkey(i, j),
B?(i, j) = B(i, j)⊕BXkey(i, j),
where i = bk/Nc, j = (k mod N).
– Diffusion I : scanning all pixel values from the
first one row by row (from top to bottom), and
masking each pixel (except for the first scanned
pixel) by its predecessor in the scan.
Set R∗(0, 0) = R?(0, 0), G∗(0, 0) = G?(0, 0),
B∗(0, 0) = B?(0, 0). For k = 1, . . . ,MN − 1,
set
R∗(i, j) = R?(i, j)⊕R∗(i′, j′),
G∗(i, j) = G?(i, j)⊕G∗(i′, j′),
B∗(i, j) = B?(i, j)⊕B∗(i′, j′),
where i = bk/Nc, j = (k mod N), i′ = b(k −
1)/Nc and j′ = ((k − 1) mod N).
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– Diffusion II : scanning all pixel values from the
last one column by column (from right to left),
and masking each pixel (except for the first scanned
pixel) by its predecessor in the scan.
Set R∗∗(M − 1, N − 1) = R∗(M − 1, N − 1),
G∗∗(M−1, N−1) = G∗(M−1, N−1), B∗∗(M−
1, N − 1) = B∗(M − 1, N − 1). For k = MN −
2, . . . , 0, set
R∗∗(i, j) = R∗(i, j)⊕G∗∗(i′, j′)⊕B∗∗(i′, j′),
G∗∗(i, j) = G∗(i, j)⊕B∗∗(i′, j′)⊕R∗∗(i′, j′),
B∗∗(i, j) = B∗(i, j)⊕R∗∗(i′, j′)⊕G∗∗(i′, j′),
where i = (k mod M), j = bk/Mc, i′ = ((k +
1) mod M), j′ = b(k + 1)/Mc.
– Confusion II : masking the pixel values with the
CKS image pixel by pixel. For k = 0, . . . ,MN −
1, set
R′(i, j) = R∗∗(i, j)⊕ CKSR(i, j),
G′(i, j) = G∗∗(i, j)⊕ CKSG(i, j),
B′(i, j) = B∗∗(i, j)⊕ CKSB(i, j).
where i = bk/Nc, j = (k mod N).
– Decryption procedure is the simple reversion of the
above encryption procedure.
3 Cryptanalysis
In [21, Sec. 4.2], it has been reported that an equivalent
secret key of the image encryption scheme under study
can be reconstructed with only one pair of known plain-
image and the corresponding cipher-image. More rigor-
ous presentation of the attack was represented in [12,
Sec. 3.1]. The equivalent form of the secret key can
only decrypt other cipher-image of smaller or the same
size of the known plain-image. In this section, we first
briefly introduce how the equivalent secret key is ob-
tained, then discuss how to derive further information
about secret key utilizing special dynamical properties
of the logistic map.
Denoting the horizontal and vertical diffusion pro-
cesses by HD and VD, respectively, the image encryp-
tion scheme under study can be represented as
I′ = VD(HD(I⊕ IXkey))⊕ ICKS
= VD(HD(I))⊕VD(HD(IXkey))⊕ ICKS
= VD(HD(I))⊕ Ikey,
where
Ikey = I
∗
Xkey ⊕ ICKS, (3)
and
I∗Xkey = VD(HD(IXkey).
As both HD and VD are independent on the secret key
and Ikey is dependent on neither the plaintext I nor the
ciphertext I′, one can see that Ikey can be used as an
equivalent key to decrypt any ciphertext of size which
is smaller than or equal to M × N , encrypted by the
same secret key (x0, y0,K, L). In the following, we will
show that the scope of x0, y0, K, and L can be further
narrowed under the same condition.
The key idea of the enhanced attack is to search
the values of {Xkey(i)}3i=0 by brute-force and verify the
search with stable self-correlation of the blue channel
of ICKS, {CKSB(i, j)} 0≤i≤M−1
0≤j≤N−1
, which is obtained from
states of logistic map. Two main points supporting the
attack are described as follows.
– Deterministic relationship between {Xkey(i)}3i=0 and
I∗Xkey
Obviously, every element of I∗Xkey comes from set
{Xkey(0),Xkey(1),Xkey(2),Xkey(3), Xkey(0)⊕Xkey(1),
Xkey(0)⊕Xkey(2),Xkey(0)⊕Xkey(3),Xkey(1)⊕Xkey(2),
Xkey(1) ⊕ Xkey(3),Xkey(2) ⊕ Xkey(3), Xkey(0) ⊕
Xkey(1) ⊕ Xkey(2), Xkey(0) ⊕ Xkey(1) ⊕ Xkey(3),
Xkey(1)⊕Xkey(2)⊕Xkey(3), Xkey(0)⊕Xkey(2)⊕
Xkey(3), Xkey(0) ⊕ Xkey(1) ⊕ Xkey(2) ⊕ Xkey(3)}.
Given M , N and {Xkey(i)}3i=0, I∗Xkey is fixed. As-
signing {Xkey(i)}3i=0 with four different numbers,
e.g., {1, 2, 4, 9}, the construction of I∗Xkey can be
known. Scan I∗Xkey in the raster order, and convert it
into a one-dimensional sequence. Note that not ev-
ery element of {Xkey(i)}3i=0 have independent influ-
ence on I∗Xkey when T = 4, where T denote period of
the one-dimensional version of I∗Xkey. For example,
the non-periodic component of I∗Xkey is {Xkey(2),
Xkey(2) ⊕ Xkey(3), Xkey(0) ⊕ Xkey(1) ⊕ Xkey(3),
Xkey(0) ⊕ Xkey(1)} when M = N = 9, where dif-
ferent combinations of Xkey(0) and Xkey(1) may
generate the same version of I∗Xkey. Under condi-
tion M = N , the relationship between T and N is
shown in Proposition 1. Fortunately, from Proposi-
tion 2, one can see that only a very minor portion
of combinations of M and N making not every ele-
ment of {Xkey(i)}3i=0 have independent influence on
I∗Xkey.
– Stable self-correlation of {CKSB(i, j)} 0≤i≤M−1
0≤j≤N−1
Recall Eq. (2), one can calculate ∆k = µk−4, where
µk = (z˜k+1/256)/((z˜k/256) · (1− (z˜k/256))).
As well known, distribution of chaotic trajectories
generated by iterating the map Eq. (1) is stable.
To verify this, distributions of a great number of
chaotic trajectories generated by iterating Logistic
map Eq. (1) for 105 times under random initial con-
ditions were studied. All the distributions are quite
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similar to each other, so only one typical example is
shown in Fig. 1 (See the invariant density of logistic
map with parameter r = 4 in [16, Fig. 2]). Further-
more, distribution of ∆k is stable also under differ-
ent values of z0. To verify this point, a great number
of initial values of z0 are chosen randomly. For each
value of z0, the corresponding sequence {z˜k} is pro-
duced by transforming the corresponding logistical
states with Eq. (2). As distributions of ∆k are simi-
lar to each other, only the distribution of ∆k under
the initial value used in Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 2.
To show the point more clearly, the distribution of
∆k over some given intervals are shown in Table 1.
In addition, distribution of ∆k is very sensitive to
change of z˜k or z˜k+1 (See Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5). So, this
stable self-correlation of {CKSB(i, j)} 0≤i≤M−1
0≤j≤N−1
can
be used to verify the search of {Xkey(i)}3i=0.
Proposition 1 When M = N , T and N satisfies that
T =

4 if (N mod 2) = 1;
2N if (N mod 4) = 0;
4N if (N mod 4) = 2.
(4)
Proof This proposition has been verified by computer
for N = 3, · · · , 1204. We leave this proposition under
the larger scope of N as a conjecture.
Proposition 2 The necessary condition making not ev-
ery element of {Xkey(i)}3i=0 have independent influence
on I∗Xkey is that
|M −N | ≤ 1. (5)
Proof This proposition has been verified by computer
for 3 ≤ M,N ≤ 1204. We leave this proposition under
the larger scope of M and N as a conjecture.
Based on the above two points, some information of
the secret key, {Xkey(i)}3i=0, can be obtained with the
following steps.
1. Obtain Ikey via
Ikey = VD(HD(I))⊕ I′;
2. Search the value of {Xkey(i)}3i=0, and get the corre-
sponding version of I∗Xkey;
3. Generate estimated version of {CKSB(i, j)} 0≤i≤M−1
0≤j≤N−1
,
{CKSB∗(i, j)} 0≤i≤M−1
0≤j≤N−1
, from the blue channel of I∗CKS =
Ikey ⊕ I∗Xkey (See Eq. (3)).
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Fig. 1 Distribution of trajectory of the map Eq. (1) under
initial state z0 = 0.226.
0  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1  
10−4
10−2
10−1
101
10−3
100
z˜k/256
∆
k
0  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1  
−100
−10−2
−10−1
−10−3
−101
Fig. 2 Distribution of {(z˜k/256,∆k)}105k=1 when z0 = 0.226.
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Fig. 3 The version of the distribution shown in Fig. 2 when
only z˜k is wrong: z˜k is replaced by z˜k + 1.
4. Calculate the distribution of {∆k}MN−2k=0 , and out-
put the search value if the distribution match with
the expected one (Refer to Table 1).
Once {Xkey(i)}3i=0 are determined, one can obtain
K = Xkey(2) mod 256, L = Xkey(3)+n·256, n = 1 ∼ 4,
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Table 1 The distribution of ∆k corresponding to the initial state z0 = 0.226.
z0 (−∞,−10) [−10i+1,−10i)−4i=0 [−10−4, 10−4) [10i, 10i+1)0i=−4 [10,+∞)
0.326 0.0195 0.0474 0.1435 0.3216 0.0897 0 0.0267 0.0150 0.0672 0.1588 0.0709 0.0196 0.0202
0.761 0.0204 0.0481 0.1431 0.3177 0.0899 0 0.0274 0.0143 0.0678 0.1610 0.0709 0.0197 0.0198
0.539 0.0203 0.0469 0.1437 0.3222 0.0905 0 0.0270 0.0141 0.0672 0.1581 0.0705 0.0192 0.0203
0.487 0.0200 0.0480 0.1412 0.3230 0.0905 0 0.0265 0.0146 0.0660 0.1593 0.0716 0.0193 0.0201
0.194 0.0206 0.0491 0.1419 0.3199 0.0879 0 0.0276 0.0150 0.0666 0.1599 0.0719 0.0192 0.0204
0.875 0.0210 0.0484 0.1430 0.3201 0.0893 0 0.0271 0.0152 0.0662 0.1603 0.0698 0.0198 0.0199
0.942 0.0211 0.0483 0.1417 0.3217 0.0877 0 0.0270 0.0154 0.0663 0.1597 0.0712 0.0194 0.0205
0.293 0.0205 0.0479 0.1426 0.3201 0.0905 0 0.0267 0.0147 0.0662 0.1597 0.0725 0.0187 0.0199
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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∆
k
Fig. 4 The version of the distribution shown in Fig. 2 when
only z˜k+1 is wrong: z˜k+1 is replaced by z˜k+1 + 1.
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Fig. 5 The version of the distribution shown in Fig. 2 when
z˜k+1 and z˜k are birth wrong: z˜k and z˜k+1 are replaced by
z˜k + 1 and z˜k+1 + 1 respectively.
x0 ∈ [Xkey(0)/256 · (2pi), (Xkey(0) + 1)/256 · (2pi)) ,
y0 ∈ [Xkey(1)/256 · (2pi), (Xkey(1) + 1)/256 · (2pi)).
Obviously, the complexity of the whole attack is
O(24·8 · L), where L is the number of plain-bytes to be
calculated. Considering L = 256 is enough for counting
the distribution of {∆k}MN−2k=0 , the complexity of the
attack is O(240). Note that the complexity of the at-
tack can be reduced much by dividing the attack into
the following two stages: 1) search for the possible val-
ues of {Xkey(i)}3i=0 of regular interval with a weaker
matching condition; 2) verify the left possible values
of {Xkey(i)}3i=0 with a stronger matching condition.
In our experiments, only the even possible values of
{Xkey(i)}3i=0 are searched, the matching condition is
set as
# ({k | |∆k| < 1/16}) > (MN/2),
where #(·) denotes cardinality of a set. In this case, the
complexity is reduced to O(236). For a PC with CPU of
2.83GHz and RAM of 2.98GB, the attack can be com-
pleted within eleven minutes. A number of experiments
were made to verify the correctness of the above attack.
With the secret key (x0, y0,K, L) = (3.98235562892545,
1.34536356538912, 108.54365761256745, 110), the out
of the first stage of the attack is {160, 54, 108, 108},
{162, 54, 108, 110}. Then, the 16 possible neighboring
values of each set are verified further, the distributions
of ∆k correspondig for the second set are shown in Ta-
ble 2. Obviously, the data shown in third row of Ta-
ble 2 is closed to the data shown in Table 1 most. So,
{Xkey(i)}3i=0 = {162, 54, 109, 110}. One can further ob-
tain that K = 109 mod 256, L = 110 +n · 256, n = 1 ∼
3, x0 ∈ [81/64·pi, 163/128·pi), y0 ∈ [27/64·pi, 55/128·pi).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, the security of a new image encryption
scheme based on logistic map is re-analyzed in detail.
Although it was reported that equivalent secret key of
the encryption scheme can be reconstructed with only
one pair of known-plaintext and the corresponding ci-
phertext, this paper further finds that the scope of all
the sub-keys can be narrowed further with relatively
low computation under the same condition. The results
reported in this paper will help study security of other
image encryption schemes based on logistic map.
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Table 2 The distribution of ∆k corresponding to 16 possible neightouring values of {162,54,108,110}.
index [−10i+1,−10i)−4i=0 [−10−4, 10−4) [10i, 10i+1)0i=−4
1 0.0629 0.1614 0.2716 0.0629 0.0000 0.0157 0.0078 0.1023 0.1811 0.1023 0.0275
2 0.0515 0.1666 0.2698 0.0238 0.0000 0.0357 0.0119 0.0753 0.2023 0.1230 0.0357
3 0.0476 0.1468 0.3373 0.0714 0.0000 0.0357 0.0119 0.0992 0.1626 0.0714 0.0119
4 0.0480 0.1600 0.3240 0.0480 0.0000 0.0240 0.0080 0.0720 0.2000 0.0800 0.0320
5 0.0557 0.1474 0.3187 0.0557 0.0000 0.0438 0.0119 0.0876 0.1434 0.1235 0.0079
6 0.0478 0.1673 0.2709 0.0557 0.0000 0.0239 0.0039 0.0876 0.2151 0.0956 0.0278
7 0.0632 0.1660 0.2885 0.0553 0.0000 0.0197 0.0079 0.0869 0.1699 0.1067 0.0316
8 0.0434 0.1778 0.2529 0.0395 0.0000 0.0316 0.0079 0.0869 0.2252 0.0909 0.0395
9 0.0634 0.1587 0.3055 0.0674 0.0000 0.0317 0.0079 0.0634 0.1587 0.1230 0.0158
10 0.0515 0.1666 0.2698 0.0714 0.0000 0.0198 0.0000 0.0753 0.2182 0.1031 0.0198
11 0.0634 0.1507 0.3492 0.0714 0.0000 0.0079 0.0079 0.0753 0.1468 0.0873 0.0357
12 0.0396 0.1507 0.3253 0.0595 0.0000 0.0277 0.0079 0.0873 0.1904 0.0793 0.0277
13 0.0632 0.1581 0.2964 0.0790 0.0000 0.0079 0.0039 0.0909 0.1620 0.1027 0.0316
14 0.0478 0.1513 0.3067 0.0438 0.0000 0.0358 0.0079 0.0756 0.1713 0.1314 0.0239
15 0.0553 0.1699 0.2885 0.0830 0.0000 0.0276 0.0039 0.0750 0.1818 0.0909 0.0197
16 0.0517 0.1713 0.2868 0.0637 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 0.0597 0.2071 0.1075 0.0239
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